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Hellman: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come

DIVIDING THE NINTH CIRCUIT: AN IDEA WHOSE
TIME HAS NOT YET COME
Arthur D. Hellman*
I. INTRODUCTION

Once again, Congress has been considering legislation to
divide the largest of the federal judicial circuits, the Ninth. In
December 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a bill
that would have created a new Twelfth Circuit consisting of the
states of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington.1 A shrunken Ninth Circuit would have been left
with only two states--California and Hawaii-and the Pacific
territories. Similar legislation was introduced in the House.2
The Senate never voted on the bill that was reported out of
the Judiciary Committee. Instead, it approved a substitute
amendment to establish a "Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals."3 The task of the commission is to study all aspects of "the structure and alignment of
the Federal courts of appeals" and to report to Congress and the
President on its recommendations for change.
The Senate's approach is the preferable course of action.
There was a time, more than 20 years ago, when the idea of
splitting the Ninth Circuit made sense. On the evidence
available today, it does not. The proponents of the legislation
have not pointed to any problems in the administration of justice
that would be cured or mitigated by this particular realignment.
Moreover, creating a new circuit could interfere with Congress's
ability to pursue more promising reforms in the future.
Many of the arguments underlying the circuit-splitting legislation have been analyzed elsewhere, notably in an article by
Professor Carl Tobias published in the Emory Law Review.4
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Portions of this
article are based on the author's testimony in Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (prepared statement of Arthur D. Hellman). The author
has benefited greatly from the counsel of Jamie Grodsky, Judith McKenna, Mark
Mendenhall, Carl Tobias, and Joe Wolfe. However, the views expressed are the
author's alone.
1. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALs REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, S. REP. No. 197, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
2. H.R. 2935, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996); see also 142 CONG. REC. E166
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996).
3. See 142 CONG. REC. S2544, S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
4. Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357
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Here I shall concentrate on five points. Because there is no longer a Senate bill that would divide the Ninth Circuit,5 I shall
refer to the House bill, H.R. 2935, as the measure embodying the
current circuit division proposal.
First, the proponents of the legislation bear the burden of
demonstrating that their proposed realignment will improve the
administration of justice in the western states. They must show
that serious problems exist in the Ninth Circuit today and that
splitting the circuit can be expected to cure or mitigate those
problems.
Second, little weight should be given to the 1973 report of
the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission), which recommended that the Ninth
Circuit be divided into two new circuits. That recommendation
has been outdistanced by events, and it cannot persuasively be
invoked in support of the current legislation.
Third, empirical studies do not support assertions that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been unable to maintain
consistency in its decisions. Nor is there any justification for
impugning the legitimacy or effectiveness of the "limited en
banc."
Fourth, arguments that circuit law in the northwestern
states should reflect a northwestern perspective rest on fundamental misconceptions about the role of the federal courts of
appeals in our legal system. Such arguments should be given no
weight in the debate over circuit realignment.
Finally, dividing the Ninth Circuit today could interfere with
Congress's ability to pursue more comprehensive appellate reform in the future.
In this article, I shall address these points on the basis of
the evidence that exists today. If a Commission on Structural Alternatives is established in accordance with the legislation
adopted by the Senate, one of its main tasks will be to compile

(1995).
5.
Three distinct versions of S. 956 have been considered by the Senate. The
bill as initially introduced would have created a Twelfth Circuit consisting of five
northwestern states, leaving four states-California, Hawaii, Nevada, and Arizona-in
the Ninth Circuit. See 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Gorton) (discussing S. 853, a predecessor of S. 956) [hereinafter 1995 Gorton
Statement]. The Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed a substitute bill that would
have enacted a seven-two split. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1. The Senate itself

adopted a different substitute that abandoned efforts to divide the Ninth Circuit and
instead established a Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals. See 142 CONG. REC. S2544, 82545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
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and analyze data that will shed more light on the issues raised
by the current proposals. Those data may well call for reconsideration of the conclusions offered here.
II. THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
We have all heard the advice, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."
This principle applies with particular force to proposed changes
in the judicial system. Judicial institutions operate and interrelate in subtle ways, and improvident reforms may have consequences that cannot be predicted even by the most knowledgeable. For that reason, Congress should insist that anyone
proposing to alter the structural arrangements in the federal
courts demonstrate-

that serious problems exist that warrant change;
that the proposed changes will cure or substantially
mitigate the problems; and
that the proposed changes are unlikely to have undesirable consequences worse than the problems being remedied.

Further, the realignment proposed in H.R. 2935 must be
evaluated from a national perspective. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals is part of a national system of courts. Its primary
function is to interpret and apply the Constitution and laws of
the United States. The question, therefore, is whether the court's
performance of that function has been impeded by conditions
that would be ameliorated by dividing the Ninth Circuit in the
manner proposed by H.R. 2935. If the answer is "No," there is no
need to go further.
In this light, it is not sufficient for proponents of H.R. 2935
simply to point to deficiencies in the court's performance. They
must provide evidence that links those deficiencies to the size of
the circuit.
To illustrate: even if the Ninth Circuit were the slowest of
the regional circuits in hearing and deciding appeals,' that

6. Recent data indicate that the Ninth Circuit's record is poor by some measures, good by others. Compare SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (citing data
showing "delay in case processing") with id. at 28 (Separate Views of Sens. Feinstein
& Kennedy) (citing other data showing that "the Circuit is fast in getting out its
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would not prove that dividing the circuit would speed up the
process. At the least, we would want to see some correlation
between circuit size and the extent of delay. Does the secondlargest circuit also have problems of delay? Is the smallest circuit the fastest? If these questions cannot be answered in the
affirmative, there is little reason to believe that dividing the
Ninth Circuit would cure problems of delay. If the correlation
does exist, further investigation would be required to determine
whether and to what extent the size of the circuit contributed
causally to the delays.
We should also be cautious in assuming that "delays" signify
deficiencies. Speed of disposition is an important value, but it is
not the only one. For example, Ninth Circuit panels provide
some kind of explanation in the overwhelming majority of the
appeals decided on the merits.7 In some other circuits, a high
proportion of cases are disposed of by judgment orders that contain no explanation whatever.8 Explaining to the losing litigant
why he or she lost takes time, but it is time well spent, even if
the effect is to lengthen the interval between filing and disposition.
III. THE HRUSKA COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION

In the debate over the current proposals to divide the Ninth
Circuit, both sides have frequently alluded to the work of the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
(Hruska Commission).9 I served as Deputy Executive Director of
the Commission, and in that capacity I drafted the 1973 report
that recommended that the Ninth Circuit be divided into two
new circuits.1" Supporters of the current proposal repeatedly

work"). Comparative data on all circuits can be found in ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. B-4 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 A.O. REPORT].
7.
See 1994 A-O. REPORT, supra note 6, at tbl. S-3.

8. For example, in the Third Circuit, nearly 60% of the dispositions on the
merits in fiscal year 1994 were "without comment." Id. (1,262 out of 2,152). In the
Ninth Circuit, only 5% of the terminations fell within that category (218 out of
4,654). Id.
9.

See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4; 142 CONG. REC. E166 (daily

ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bunn); 142 CONG. REC. S2225 (daily ed.
Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Reid).
10. See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The
Geographical Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for
Change, 62 F.R.D. 223, 236 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission, Geographical
Boundaries]. Two years after issuing its report on circuit realignment, the Commission issued a final report that addressed a broad spectrum of issues relating to the
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invoke that recommendation. 1 However, the Hruska Commission report provides little support for H.R. 2935. On the contrary, adherence to the principles underlying the Hruska Commission plan leads to rejection of the House bill.
To begin with, the Hruska Commission proposal was quite
different from either the original version of S. 956 or the substitute bill approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and embodied in H.R. 2935. Under the Hruska Commission plan, two of
the four judicial districts of California would have been included
in the northern circuit (along with the five northwestern states,
Hawaii, and Guam) and two in the southern. 2 In contrast, H.R.
2935 would create a "stringbean" circuit encompassing all of the
present Ninth Circuit except California, Hawaii, and the Pacific
territories.
It is a moot point whether the realignment proposed by the
Hruska Commission would have achieved the desired ends if the
legislation had been enacted in the mid-1970s. Circumstances
have changed considerably over the past twenty years, and today
the Hruska Commission's recommendation should be given little
weight. Several considerations underlie this conclusion.
A. The Hruska Commission's Criteriaand the CurrentProposal
In making its recommendations for circuit realignment, the
Hruska Commission was guided by "several important criteria.""3 One was that "no circuit should be created which would
immediately require more than nine active judges." 4 Another
was that "where practicable, circuits should be composed of at
least three states; in any event, no one-state circuits should be
created." 5
structure and internal procedures of the federal courts of appeals. See Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures:
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter Hruska Commission,
Structure and Internal Procedures].
11. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S2221 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Burns); 142 CONG. REC. E166 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bunn).
12. See Hruska Commission, Geographical Boundaries, supra note 10, at 236.
One member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently endorsed the Hruska
Commission proposal. See Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Study Commission: Now What?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 313 (1996).
13.
Hruska Commission, Geographical Boundaries, supra note 10, at 231-32.
14. Id. at 232.
15. Id. at 231-32. A decade later, an American Bar Association committee referred to "the widely shared assumption[] . . . that each circuit must consist of at

least three adjoining states."

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING
COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
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It is impossible to divide the Ninth Circuit today without
violating at least one of these criteria. H.R. 2935 (like the substitute bill approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee) violates
both.
Under H.R. 2935, the Twelfth Circuit would be a circuit of
13 active judges; the new Ninth Circuit would have 15. That
violates the first of the quoted principles.
Also, under the proposed legislation, the new Ninth Circuit
would include only two states (along with the Pacific Territories).
This would violate the second-quoted criterion. Moreover, the
particular two-state circuit-California and Hawaii-would run
afoul of the policies that underlie the Commission's emphatic
rejection of a one-state circuit. The Commission wrote:
Although the judges in a single state may differ widely in any
number of respects, the "pool" from which nominees are likely
to be chosen, as well as the processes which lead to an appointment, would inevitably be narrower in a single state than in
several. On a less tangible but perhaps ultimately more important level, there is the risk that a single-state circuit would no
longer be perceived as a national court in quite the same way
and to the same degree as a court which draws its judges from
several states.1"
These concerns are only slightly ameliorated in a two-state
circuit, especially when the circuit consists of one very large
state and one small one. California contributes 94% of the caseload of the proposed new Ninth Circuit. 7 In all likelihood, California would contribute all but one of the judges. Indeed, at the
present time, every one of the active judges in the proposed new
Ninth Circuit is from California. Thus, like creation of a onestate circuit, H.R. 2935 (in the words of the Hruska Commission)
8
"invites the loss of important elements of our federalism."
This does not necessarily mean that the Ninth Circuit
should not be divided. Rather, it means that the principles espoused by the Hruska Commission must be reconsidered in light

APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A CENTURY OF GROWTH 7
(1989) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMMITTEE, REEXAMINING STRUCTURE].

16. Hruska Commission, Structure and Internal Procedures, supra note 10, at
267.
17. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30 (separate views of Sens.
Feinstein & Kennedy). Administrative Office data, which do not apportion administrative agency appeals, yield a figure of 93%. See 1994 A-0. REPORT, supra note 6, at
tbl. B-3A (3,743 cases out of 4,019).
18. Hruska Commission, supra note 10, at 267.
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of the many changes that have occurred in the appellate system
in the last 20 years. That is why Congress should create a new
commission to study the federal appellate courts before acting on
any proposal to divide the Ninth Circuit.
B. Disclaimersin More Recent Studies
There has not been a study commission on the federal appellate courts since the Hruska Commission finished its work in
1975. However, two eminent study groups have analyzed the
problems of the federal judicial system as a whole. Neither of
these recommended that the Ninth Circuit be divided, either in
accordance with the Hruska Commission's recommendation or in
the configuration contemplated by the Senate Judiciary Committee. On the contrary, both panels expressed skepticism about
circuit realignment as a means of coping with increased caseloads.
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee, which included among its members two Senators and two Congressmen, 9
issued a report that had one chapter on the "crisis of volume" in
the federal appellate courts.2" The Study Committee presented
various models of appellate structure, but it did not endorse any
of them. Nor did it take any position "on whether the Ninth
Circuit should be split."2 However, in the course of its analysis,
the Study Committee observed, "The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit-a jumbo' circuit today-apparently manages
effectively... Perhaps the Ninth Circuit represents a workable
alternative to the traditional model."'
In March 1995, the Committee on Long-Range Planning of
the Judicial Conference of the United States issued another
broad-ranging report.2" That report, which has now been approved by the Judicial Conference, contrasts even more sharply
with the approach taken by the Hruska Commission. In particular:

19. The Senators were Charles E. Grassley of Iowa and Howell T. Heflin of
Alabama. The Congressmen were Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin and Carlos J.
Moorhead of California.
20. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE 109-31 (1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT].

21.
22.
23.

Id. at 123.
Id. at 122.

COMMrTrEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995)
[hereinafter PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN].
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The report explicitly
disclaims "a fixed numerical limit
24
to circuit size."
It emphasizes that proposed changes in circuit boundaries "must be considered in the light of the disruption
of precedent and judicial
administration that such
25
changes generally entail."
It concludes: "Circuit restructuring should occur only if
compelling empirical evidence demonstrates adjudicative
or administrative dysfunction in a court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent,
consistent circuit law in the face of increasing caseload."2 8
There have been other studies as well over the past 20
years. 27 None has endorsed the Hruska Commission recommendation for a division of the Ninth Circuit.28 This is further evidence that the recommendation has been outdistanced by events
and is no longer a sound basis for legislation.
C. The Division of the Fifth Circuit:A False Parallel
Supporters of H.R. 2935 and its Senate predecessor have
noted that the Hruska Commission recommended division not
only of the Ninth Circuit, but also of the Fifth Circuit as it existed in 1973.29 The division of the old Fifth Circuit took place in
1980, and that fact has been given as a reason for dividing the

24. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 23, at 42.
25. Id. at 43.
26. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
27. For example, in 1989 a committee of the American Bar Association reconsidered many of the issues addressed by the Hruska Commission. See ABA STANDING
COMMITTEE, REEXAMINING STRUCTURE, supra note 15.
28. The 1989 American Bar Association committee report recommended four
"specific steps." Id. at 41. None involved circuit realignment. Further, the committee
referred to "the widely shared assumption[] that each state must fall entirely within
one circuit." Id. at 7. Acceptance of that assumption would require rejection of the
Hruska Commission's proposal for dividing the Ninth Circuit. See supra text accompanying note 15.
29. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7506 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Burns) ([A] commission which studied the revision of the Federal appellate court
system recommended in 1973 that both the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
courts be split."); 142 CONG. REC. E166 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Bunn) ("The Hruska Commission recommended in 1973 that both the Fifth and the
Ninth Circuits be divided due to overwhelming size and caseload.").
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Ninth Circuit today.3" However, the argument is a non-sequitur.
The situations are quite different. If anything, the history of the
Fifth Circuit counsels against division of the Ninth.
It is a historical fact that Congress divided the former Fifth
Circuit in 1980, and that it followed the alignment recommended
by the Hruska Commission in 1973. But the more significant fact
is that Congress acted only when the judges and the lawyers of
the region, speaking with a voice that was nearly unanimous,
agreed that the split was necessary.3
A bill to divide the Fifth Circuit was introduced in Congress
only two months after the Hruska Commission issued its realignment report.3 2 But the legislation was not enacted at that time,
or for several years thereafter. Why? One of the main reasons is
that the proposed division was strongly opposed by some members of the court, as well as by some lawyers' groups.' By 1980,
however, professional opinion had turned around. As Barrow and
Walker report, "The Circuit Council [of the old Fifth Circuit]
unanimously signed a petition to Congress requesting that legislation be passed to divide the Fifth into two completely autonomous circuits."" In addition, "statements urging division were
registered by the bar associations of each of the six states, the
magistrates of the Fifth Circuit, the district judges of the Fifth
Circuit, the bankruptcy judges of the Fifth Circuit, the Federal
Bar Association, and the Justice Department."'
This unanimity of professional opinion also characterized the
one previous division of a circuit. That was in 1929, when Congress carved out the Tenth Circuit from the old Eighth. By the
time hearings were held on the circuit division proposal, all of
the judges of the existing Eighth Circuit and bar associations of

30. See, e.g., 142 CoNG. REC. E166 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1996) (remarks of Rep.
Bunn) (citing division of the Fifth Circuit as "recent precedent for the successful split
of a Circuit Court of Appeals"); SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 ('The split of
the fifth circuit has . . . been universally considered a success.").
31. For a detailed account of the events leading up to the division of the Fifth
Circuit, see DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988)
[hereinafter BARROW & WALKER]; see also Arthur D. Hellman, Deciding Who Decides:
Understanding the Realities of Judicial Reform, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 343 (1990).
32. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 31, at 171.
33. For example, at hearings in the House in 1977, three judges testified
against dividing the circuit. Opposition was also voiced by the Alabama Black Lawyers Association and other civil rights groups. See id. at 200-06.
34. Id. at 236. At that time the circuit council was composed of all active judges of the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1970).
35. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 31, at 240-41.
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eight states had expressed their approval. 6
In virtually every respect, the contrast with H.R. 2935 and
its Senate predecessor could not be more acute.37 At the 1995
hearing on S. 956, Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace argued strongly against splitting the circuit.3 8 The new Chief Judge, Proctor
Hug, Jr., shares his view.39 Nor is this simply a personal perspective. "The Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit and the Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit-the two entities that Congress has designated for circuit governance-oppose the division
of the circuit."' ° Five of the nine state bar associations in the
circuit have spoken out against the split; no more than one has
supported it. 1
In dividing the Fifth Circuit in 1980, Congress acted in accordance with the overwhelming weight of professional opinion
within the circuit. Today, respect for professional opinion in the
nine states of the west leads to the conclusion that the time has
not yet come to divide the Ninth Circuit.
This is not to say that the views of the judges and lawyers
in a circuit should invariably be given controlling weight in determining whether realignment is appropriate. There may be
situations in which professional opinion is counterbalanced by

36. Arthur J. Stanley & Irma S. Russell, The Political and Administrative History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 60 DENVER L.J. 119,
127 (1983).
37. What makes the contrast especially striking is that as early as 1977, a
majority of the judges of the Fifth Circuit supported the split. See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 31, at 191 (circuit council voted 10-3 in favor of division). Congress
did not act until the court spoke with a single voice.
38. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995: Hearings on S.
956 Before The Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Hon. J. Clifford Wallace, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit).
39. See Proctor Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 57 MONT. L.
REv. 291 (1996).
40. OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995 (June 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec.
S10436 (daily ed. July 20, 1995).
41. See 142 CONG. REC. S2219-03, S2221-23 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Reid) (resolutions by bar associations in Arizona, Nevada, Montana, California, and Hawaii). Reference was made at the Senate hearing to support
by the Washington state bar association for a division of the circuit, but the discussion is at best ambiguous. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of
1995: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (statement of John McKay). Significantly, the Senate Report on S.
956 did not claim support from any state bar association. See SENATE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 8 (stating that "numerous State attorney generals and practitioners in the
ninth circuit have indicated support for the circuit's division.").
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other evidence that points to a different conclusion. But that is
not the case here.
One final point warrants attention. Some supporters of the
current circuit division proposal have suggested, at least implicitly, that bar associations do not adequately represent the views
of lawyers in a particular state.42 That may be so, but it would
be unsound to make that judgment on the basis of casual conversations or anecdotal reports. What is needed is a systematic
study aimed at ascertaining whether the experiences of lawyers
in the Ninth Circuit-and elsewhere-lend support to the concerns that underlie H.R. 2935. If a Commission on Structural
Alternatives is established in accordance with the Senate vote,
one of the most useful things it could do would be to carry out
that inquiry.43
D. The Commission's Premises and the Circuit'sInnovations
The Hruska Commission explicitly predicated its recommendation for division of the Ninth Circuit on the premise that
"[s]erious problems of administration and of internal operation
inevitably result with" an appellate court of fifteen or more active judges." However, the Ninth Circuit's experience over the
past decade and a half demonstrates that innovative approaches
to adjudication and administration can go far towards mitigating
the problems of operating a large court--even one much larger
than fifteen judges. For example:
Computerized issue tracking systems, far more sophisticated than anything available in 1973, assist the court
in assuring that panels are aware of what others are
doing and conform to existing precedents.
*

The "limited en banc" authoritatively establishes the

42. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S2231 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kyl) (acknowledging opposition by the "so-called organized bar, the political organization" to division of the circuit, but stating that "there is very definitely a split"
among Arizona lawyers); SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
43. I emphasize that it would not be adequate to confine the study to lawyers
who practice in the Ninth Circuit. The object of the inquiry is not to evaluate conditions in that one circuit, but to ascertain whether there are any aspects of the Ninth
Circuit's operations, attributable to size, that bear on the question whether the circuit
should be divided. The only hope of getting such information is to compare conditions
in the Ninth Circuit with conditions in other, smaller circuits. (Of course, even then,
the task of identifying causal relationships would be formidable.)
44. Hruska Commission, Geographical Boundaries, supra note 10, at 227.
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law of the circuit without the need for participation by
all active judges in every case.'
An executive committee of the court of appeals allows
the court to concentrate the responsibilities of administration and governance in a small rotating group of
judges rather than burdening all.'6
The restructuring of the circuit council frees most of the
court of appeals judges from having to spend time on
matters relating to the governance of the trial courts
within the circuit.47
Technological advances also underlie the recommendation of
the Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts that circuit realignment continue to be "an infrequent event."' As stated in the
Planning Committee's report, "Technological solutions, such as
circuit-wide electronic networks and chambers access to court
dockets, can keep a court in close communication, helping to
maintain a level of collegiality that otherwise would be unattainable."49
E. The Court and the Circuit
The mandate of the Hruska Commission was to examine the
structure and internal procedures of the federal court appellate
system. The Commission had no occasion to consider, and did not
consider, the operation of the circuit as distinguished from the
court of appeals. But one of the important points to emerge from
the study of Ninth Circuit innovations published in 1990 is the
role of the circuit as an institution for promoting regional decentralization in the federal judicial system." This consideration

45. For further discussion of the limited en banc, see infra Part IV.
46. For detailed analysis, see Thomas W. Church, Jr., Administration of an
Appellate Leviathan: Court Management in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS 226 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING
JUSTICE].
47. For a comprehensive discussion of the circuit council, see Doris M. Provine,
Governing the Ungovernable: The Theory and Practice of Governance of the Ninth
Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 247.
48. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 23, at 43.
49. Id. at 42.
50. The role of the circuit and the operation of circuit-wide institutions are
examined in Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Its Implications
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casts further doubt on the relevance of the Hruska Commission
recommendation to the present proposals.
Half a century ago, Congress created the circuit councils and
made them "the cornerstone of the federal judiciary's administrative institution."51 The architects of that system viewed the circuit as "an intermediate structure that makes it possible to carry
out the tasks of adjudication and governance from a perspective
that transcends the borders of a single district or state, yet without concentrating power in a centralized set of institutions."52
Over the last few decades, Congress has moved further in that
direction by adding to the responsibilities of the circuit councils.'
The large circuit may well have some advantages in carrying
out these tasks. On the administrative side, economies of scale
can be realized. Staff specialization, especially in matters involving technology, is more feasible. And in matters of governance,
the larger and more diversified the polity, the easier it is to
bring a variety of viewpoints to bear on the work of the courts
within the districts. During the last decade and a half, the Ninth
Circuit has pioneered in the development of circuit-wide institutions that strengthen the system of regional decentralization
established by Congress in 1939.
From this perspective, there is a certain poignancy in the
fact that H.R. 2935, like its Senate predecessor, is called the
"Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act." Of course,
the legislation would also reorganize the circuit council, the
circuit conference, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, and other institutions that in some ways have made a distinct virtue of size.
F. Trade-Offs and the Future
When the Hruska Commission issued its report on circuit
realignment, innovative approaches to appellate adjudication
were in their infancy. Today we have much more experience. But
in the 20-plus years since the Hruska Commission completed its

for Adoption of Specialist Panels in the Courts of Appeals, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 165; Doris M. Provine, Governing the Ungovernable: The Theory and Practice of Governance in the Ninth Circuit, id. at 247; Stephen L. Wasby,
The Bar's Role in Circuit Governance, id. at 281; Judith Resnik, Independent and Interdependent: The Ninth Circuit and the Federal Judiciary, id. at 321.
51. PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 165
(1973).
52. RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 15.
53. See generally Provine, supra note 47.
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work, there has not been another study commission on the federal appellate courts.5 Such a study should be conducted before
proceeding with ad hoc structural alteration.
One reason a study is needed is that any "solution" carries
tradeoffs. The quest is not for the perfect solution (there is none),
but for innovations in structure or process that will bring improvement with a minimum of damage to other values. Only a
thorough analysis, taking very little as a "given," can provide a
sound foundation for choosing among the various possibilities.
For example, over the years there have been several suggestions
for establishing rotating subject-matter panels within large
courts of appeals.55 Judges have not responded favorably to this
idea, but if it proved to be the most workable alternative to
balkanization of the appellate system, it might look considerably
more attractive.
G. Conclusion
Twenty-one years after the Hruska Commission issued its
final report, I continue to take pride in the research and analysis
that the Commission produced.56 But for the reasons given, the
Hruska Commission's recommendation of 1973 should not be
viewed as supporting the desirability of enacting H.R. 2935 or
similar legislation today.
IV.

CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY IN THE LAW OF THE
CIRCUIT

One of the principal arguments made by proponents of the
current legislation is that, because of its size, the Ninth Circuit
has been unable to maintain consistency in the decisions of its
court of appeals. For example, Senator Gorton stated, "The large
number of judges scattered over a large area inevitably results in
difficulty in reaching consistent circuit decisions."57 More gener54. There have been study groups with broader missions, but none that have
investigated, in detail and depth, the structures of appellate adjudication in the federal system.
55. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, Struggling Against the Tower of Babel, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 195.

56. For example, I continue to believe that "the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure [should] require that in every case there be some record, however brief,
and in whatever the form, of the reasoning which impelled the decision." Hruska
Commission, Structure and Internal Procedures, supra note 10, at 258. As noted
above, this would require substantial change in the practice of some circuits. See

supra note 8 and accompanying text.
57.

1995 Gorton Statement, supra note 5, at S7504; see also 142 CONG. REC.
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ally, Chief Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit has
contended that "Ib]y their very nature, jumbo courts experience
increasing difficulty in creating and sustaining a clear and stable
legal regime.""
Critics of the Ninth Circuit recognize that the mechanism of
en banc rehearing is available to resolve intracircuit conflicts.59
They argue, however, that the "limited en banc" pioneered by the
Ninth Circuit is not an adequate substitute for "the traditional
en banc procedure" followed in other circuits."
These criticisms echo concerns that were articulated by the
Hruska Commission more than 20 years ago.6 ' If valid today,
they would support the view that the Ninth Circuit should be
divided because it is too large to function effectively. But on the
record as it stands in 1996, the criticisms are not valid. The
assertions about inconsistency are contradicted by empirical
research. The concerns about the limited en banc are unfounded.
A. The Findings on IntracircuitConflict
In the absence of evidence, it would certainly be plausible to
speculate that the large number of judges in the Ninth Circuit
and the hundreds of different three-judge combinations would
lead to conflicts among panel decisions. But speculation is no
substitute for evidence, 2 and in this instance we do have evidence.
The evidence is found in a series of empirical studies that I
conducted for the specific purpose of determining the extent of
intracircuit conflict in the Ninth Circuit. The Federal Judicial
Center, in its comprehensive report on the structure of the federal courts of appeals, described this work as "the only systematic
study of the operation of precedent in a large circuit."' This
research does not support the argument that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has been unable to maintain consistency in its
E166 (daily ed. Feb. 1. 1996) (statement of Rep. Bunn) ('The number of judges alone
prevents consistency in the ninth circuit.").
58. Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.BA J., July 1993, at 7071. Judge Tjoflat testified at the Senate hearing on S. 956 and submitted this article
as part of his written statement.
59.
See FED. R. APP. P. 35.
60. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
61. Hruska Commission, Geographical Boundaries, supra note 10, at 235.
62. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Conference on Empirical Research in Judicial Administration, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 33, 34 (1989).
63.
JUDITH A. MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 94 (Federal Judicial Center 1993).
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decisions.
In the first of these studies, I formulated a comprehensive
definition of intracircuit conflict and applied it to 175 cases randomly selected from the published panel decisions handed down
by the Ninth Circuit in 1983. 4 The sample encompassed 22 percent of the court's published work in that year.
The study concluded that intracircuit conflict is not as much
of a problem as it is sometimes thought to be, and that the perception of conflict in the Ninth Circuit has been skewed by the
admitted disarray in a few high-visibility areas of the law characterized by a large volume of cases and fact-specific legal rules.
The results are set forth in detail in an article published in the
University of Chicago Law Review in 1989.5

In the second study, a follow-up to the first, I analyzed 212
panel decisions handed down by the Ninth Circuit in 1986. This
was nearly one-quarter of the published work of the court's
three-judge panels in that year. I applied the same criteria as I
had to the 1983 sample. Once again, the evidence indicated that
the Ninth Circuit has generally succeeded in avoiding conflicts
between panel decisions. A full account will be found in an article published in the Arizona State Law Review. 6
B. The Findings on Predictability
As Judge Tjoflat's article makes clear, resistance to "jumbo"
courts is not grounded solely on concerns about inconsistency.
Skeptics argue that quite apart from actual conflicts, enlarging
the number of judges in a circuit makes the law less predictable.67 In the Arizona State study, I attempted to determine
empirically whether unpredictability on appeal correlates with
circumstances that would be more prevalent in a large circuit
than a small one. I did this by using dissent within court of
64. Although some aspects of the definition are controversial, the points of controversy would have affected only a handful of cases in the sample. See Arthur D.
Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court,
23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 923, 926, 930 (1991) [hereinafter Hellman, Breaking the Banc];
McKENNA, supra note 63, at 94.
65. See Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence:The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989) [hereinafter Hellman, Jumboism].
66. Hellman, Breaking the Banc, supra note 64. Again, the controversial aspects
of the definition of intracircuit conflict played only a minor role in the empirical
findings.
67. See, e.g., TIoflat, supra note 58, at 71 (discussing "uncertainty of outcomes,"
"unpredictability," and "lack of clarity" in the decisions of "jumbo courts").
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appeals panels as a proxy for unpredictability.
As explained in the article, "A dissenting opinion provides
concrete evidence that the outcome on appeal was not foreclosed.
We can readily suppose that but for the luck of the draw, one of
the judges in the majority might have been replaced by a judge
who shared the views of the dissenter; if so, the outcome would
have been different.... [B]y studying the grounds for disagreement within panels, we... [can] identify the circumstances that
make appellate outcomes unpredictable."6 8 In pursuit of this
inquiry, I analyzed all 120 dissenting opinions in published panel decisions of the Ninth Circuit handed down in calendar year
1986.
The findings of the study provide little support for the thesis
that predictability of appellate outcomes suffers in the large circuit. In particular, I concluded that "what makes for an unpredictable outcome generally is not an oversupply of circuit decisions, but the absence of a circuit precedent that is closely on
point or, less commonly, a fact-specific rule of law that by its
nature requires case-by-case evaluation. These conditions are no
more likely to obtain in the large circuit than the small; if anything, they will occur less often in the large circuit because the
larger number of decisions increases the odds that there will be
a precedent on point.""
C. FurtherEvidence on Inconsistency
Although the study of dissents focused on identifying sources
of unpredictability in appellate decisions, the results also shed
light on the debate over inconsistency in the large circuit. To
borrow (and adapt) a favorite literary allusion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the research directs our attention to a large and

68. See Hellman, Breaking the Banc, supra note 64, at 981-82.
69. Id at 984. A lawyer from Washington State made a similar point in commenting on the 1989 bill to divide the Ninth Circuit. He said, "As a practitioner [in
the Ninth Circuit] I can far more readily determine the state of the law on a particular question and advise my clients accurately about it than I could in a small circuit. A Circuit Court of limited size often will not have an opportunity to address a
specific question.... [Like a motorist in an unfamiliar city[,] I am thankful for
many signposts along the way and much prefer that to searching for an uncharted
way." Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 948
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 507 (1990) (letter from Irwin H. Schwartz, Federal Bar Association, Western District of Washington, to Subcomm. on Courts and
Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 19, 1990)) [hereinafter 1990 Hearings].
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excitable dog that did not bark in the nighttime.
We know that dissenting judges do not shrink from accusing
colleagues of flouting circuit precedent when they believe that
the judges in the majority have done so.7° Thus, if there were
any grounds for arguing that the majority's decision in a new
case was inconsistent with an earlier decision of the court, we
would expect the dissenter to say so.
It is significant, therefore, that this kind of argument is
made so seldom by dissenting judges in the Ninth Circuit. As
reported in the Arizona State article, "In 65 of the 120 cases
with dissents, circuit precedents contrary to the majority's result
were cited by the majority, by the dissent, or by both. Yet in no
more than twelve of the cases did the dissenting judge argue-or
even imply-that there were no relevant distinctions between
the earlier decision and the case at hand. In the vast majority of
cases, the dissenting judge might have found support in the
contrary precedent, but did not argue that it was compelling."7
In the remaining 55 cases-nearly half of the total-no contrary
Ninth Circuit precedents were cited in either opinion.
If the "astounding" array of panel combinations in the Ninth
Circuit72 were truly creating "a cacophony of differing opinions,"73 dissenting judges in new cases should have little difficulty in finding circuit precedents to invoke in opposition to a
majority decision. The fact that they so seldom pursue that line
of argument suggests that such precedents generally do not exist.
Negative evidence is not conclusive. But when added to the
findings based on the random samples from 1983 and 1986,
these results strongly contradict the assertion that conflict be-

70. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1196
(3d Cir. 1993) (Seitz, J., dissenting) (asserting that circuit precedent distinguished by
majority "is not distinguishable"); United States v. McGregor, 11 F.3d 1133, 1139 (2d
Cir. 1993) (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (stating that "this case cannot be meaningfully
distinguished from" a circuit precedent). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 232-34 (1985) (discussing the "abusive dissent");
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1194-95
(1992) (criticizing intemperate language in dissents).
71. Hellman, Breaking the Banc, supra note 64, at 931-32.
72. Tjoflat, supra note 58, at 72.
73. Id. at 71 (quoting Judge Irving Kaufman).
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tween panel decisions is a common phenomenon in the Ninth
Circuit.
D. Possible Challenges
I can anticipate two possible challenges to conclusions based
on the studies I have described.74 First, the studies took as their
subject the work of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
early and mid 1980s. Since that time, the court's caseload has
grown substantially. Are the conclusions still valid today? There
is every reason to think that they are. Notwithstanding the increased number of dispositions, the number of published opinions
remains about the same as it was during the period of my studies.75 And it is only published opinions that can give rise to conflicts. As explained in one of the studies, "Under court rules,
unpublished opinions have no precedential value and cannot be
cited to or by courts within the circuit. A case that has no
precedential value cannot give rise to an intracircuit conflict, or
more accurately cannot create a conflict that will generate uncertainty or inconsistency in the law of the circuit."7" In this
light, I do not think that the passage of time casts doubt on the
continuing validity of conclusions based on the published studies.
The second possible ground of challenge relies on the limitation just described-the fact that I did not include unpublished
opinions in either of the two random samples. This point was, in
fact, made at hearings held in 1990 on a predecessor to S. 956."
Upon reflection, and drawing upon the studies of precedent

74. One actual challenge deserves brief mention. At the hearings on S. 956,
Chief Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit suggested that no reliable
empirical study of intracircuit conflict could ever be conducted because '[t]here are
so many ways in which precedent can be disregarded in cases.'" See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 10 n.19 (quoting Judge Tjoflat). The implications of this remark are
extremely troubling. Was Judge Tjoflat acknowledging that he has, himself, "disregarded" binding precedent of his own circuit? Was he accusing his colleagues on the
Eleventh Circuit of doing so? Or was he saying that although judges of his own
court treat precedent with appropriate respect, judges of other courts do not? I find
it hard to believe that Judge Tjoflat would, upon reflection, adhere to the suggestion
that judges routinely flout precedent in a way that cannot be identified through
objective study. Without that premise, his criticism loses its force.
75. From 1983 through 1988, the number of published opinions ranged from
717 to 946. See Hellman, Jumboism, supra note 65, at 554-55 n.44. In more recent
years, the figure has remained under 900. See, e.g., 1994 A-O. REPORT, supra note 6,
at 32 tbl. S-3 (893 published opinions in statistical year 1994).
76. Helman, Jumboism, supra note 65, at 554.
77. 1990 Hearings, supra note 69, at 678, 686 (statement of former Sen.

Hruska).
Published
by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1996

19

Montana Law Review, Vol. 57 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 3

280

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

that I have been pursuing over the last few years, I do not think
that this limitation should be given great weight in evaluating
conclusions based on my research. For one thing, although I did
not look for conflicts created by unpublished opinions, I did (in
the later study) examine unpublished opinions for evidence of
confusion or inconsistency created by conflicts between published
opinions."
More important is the kind of case typically decided by unpublished opinion. Generally, unpublished opinions apply established rules to fact-specific grounds of appeal. Was the evidence
sufficient to support a conviction? Did the defendant knowingly
consent to a search? Did prosecutorial misconduct deprive the
defendant of a fair trial? Did the prejudicial effect of evidence
outweigh its probative value? Did the evidence support a claim of
disability under the Social Security Act?
In these cases, there is generally no dispute over the law.
Rather, the outcome depends on the judges' reading of the record
and their evaluation of the facts. Almost by definition, it is impossible to have a conflict between two such cases. The facts are
unique, and the question is whether the case falls on one side of
the line or the other.
Moreover, many unpublished opinions involve rulings by
trial courts or administrative agencies that are reviewed deferentially, either for abuse of discretion or for clear error. When the
governing law allows "a zone of choice within which the trial
courts may go either way" without being reversed, 9 it is almost
impossible that appellate decisions will come into conflict with
one another. Indeed, different appellate panels might well affirm
contrary trial court rulings in similar cases. That would not
create an intracircuit conflict.
E. The Limited En Banc
In 1973, when the Hruska Commission recommended a
division of the Ninth Circuit, there was no such thing as a limited en banc court. Two years later, in its final report on structure
and internal procedures, the Commission endorsed the idea as
the best way of managing a large circuit."0 The idea was very
much in its infancy, and the Commission struggled both with the
78.
79.
80.

See Hellman, Breaking the Banc, supra note 64, at 941 n.153.
Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970-71 (8th Cir. 1984).
Hruska Commission, Structure and Internal Procedures, supra note 10, at
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basic concept and with the details of implementation."s
Three years after the Hruska Commission's final report, in
the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Congress authorized any
court of appeals with more than 15 active judges to "perform its
en banc function by such number of [judges] as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals." 2 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals accepted this invitation, and the limited en
banc has been in operation since 1980.83
Some supporters of circuit division have attacked the Ninth
Circuit's use of the limited en banc court." They express particular concern that the outcome of en banc decisions can be controlled by a small minority of the full court." These attacks are
misguided.
En banc decisions, in the Ninth Circuit as elsewhere, constitute a tiny minority of precedential decisions. In 1994, there
were only about 100 en banc decisions in all circuits." Overwhelmingly, the law of the circuit is established by the decisions
of three-judge panels, with two judges sufficient for a majority.
Often the two judges include a district judge or a visiting judge
from another circuit.8 7 Decisions of this kind are fully authoritative, no less than those that are actually endorsed by a majority
of the court's active judges. The reason is simple: everyone recognizes that in a system that has grown to the size of the federal
appellate courts today, three-judge panel decisions must be the
rule rather than the exception."
81. The members of the Commission never reached a consensus as to the best
method of selecting the members of the limited en banc court. See id.
82. Act of Oct. 20, 1987, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1633.
83. For a detailed account of the deliberations leading to the establishment of
the present system, see Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of
the Large Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 55 [hereinafter

Hellman, Maintaining Consistency].
84. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that "[t]rue en banc
review in the ninth circuit is effectively nonexistent"); 1995 Gorton Statement, supra
note 5, at S7504 (stating that limited en banc panels "further contribute to the inherent unpredictability of a jurisdiction as large as the ninth circuit").
85. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S2220 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Burns) (describing the limited en banc procedure as one that "permit[s] as few as six
of the sitting judges to dictate the outcome of a case contrary to the judgment of 22
others, solely depending on the luck of the draw"); SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at
10.
86. 1994 A.O. REPORT, supra note 6, at tbl. S-1. The total number of cases
terminated on the merits was more than 27,000. Id.
87. In three circuits, visiting judges accounted for more than 10% of the total
case participation in cases terminated on the merits in statistical year 1994. The
Ninth Circuit's figure was 6.1%. See 1994 A.O. REPORT, supra note 6, at 29 tbl. S-2.
88.ScholarWorks
See Helman,
theofBanc,
supra1996
note 64, at 985-86.
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The limited en banc was authorized by Congress as one
response to growing appellate caseloads. The available evidence
indicates that the limited en banc in the Ninth Circuit is no less
effective than other devices for establishing a law of the circuit
that is regarded as legitimate and binding. For example, the
court's rules allow rehearing by the full court of limited en banc
decisions,89 but this has never happened. Thus, on the record
today, the only conclusion to be reached is that the limited en
banc is an innovation that works."
Curiously, the Senate Report on S. 956 views the absence of
full-court rehearings as evidence that the limited en banc does
not serve its purpose.2 That puts the matter backwards. The
most plausible explanation for the court's failure to grant fullcourt rehearing is that the judges accept the rulings of the limited en banc panels as definitive expositions of the law of the circuit.
Admittedly, there may be better solutions (contrary to the
view of the Hruska Commission). But the limited en banc is a
matter that should be investigated as part of a systematic study
of the federal courts of appeals, not belittled on the basis of speculation.
V. REGIONALISM AND DOMINATION BY "CALIFORNIA JUDGES"

Another major argument made by some supporters of circuit
division is that creating a separate circuit for the five northwestern states will bring a much-needed regional perspective to federal appellate adjudication. For example, a resolution adopted by
the Montana Senate argues that "an essential element of a federal appellate system must include guaranteeing regionalized and
decentralized review when regional concerns are strongest."93 In
89. 9TH Cm. R. 35-3.
90. See Hellman, Maintaining Consistency, supra note 83, at 70 & n.35; Carol
M. Ostrom, 9th Circuit Court Asks for New Briefs in Case, SEATTLE TIMEs, Mar. 28,
1996, at B3.
91. The limited en banc may actually have some advantages over the traditional practice. For instance, in other circuits, an equal division among the judges may
result in a per curiam affirmance that provides no precedential guidance whatever.
See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 77 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (stating
that the "judgment of the district court is affirmed by an evenly-divided vote of the
en banc court."); Elliott v. United States, 37 F.3d 617 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(stating that "judges of the en banc court are equally divided on the proper judgment
of this case. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed by operation of
law.").
92. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11.
93. See 141 CONG. REC. S7506 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
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a similar vein, an Idaho newspaper editorialized that "the judiciary serves best when it is closest to the people."94
Senator Gorton has stated the point even more strongly. In
his view, the Ninth Circuit is "dominated by California judges
and California judicial philosophy." This is undesirable because
"the interests of the Northwest cannot be fully appreciated or
addressed from a California perspective."95
96
These arguments are both unpersuasive and misguided.
To begin with, who is a "California judge"? Judge James R.
Browning now lives in California, but he was born and educated
in Montana. Is he a "California judge"? Judge Alfred T. Goodwin
served with distinction on the Oregon Supreme Court; Judge
Robert Boochever did so on the Alaska Supreme Court. Both now
have their chambers in Pasadena. Are they "California judges"?
Judge Stephen S. Trott now lives in Idaho, but for most of his
career he was a prosecutor in Los Angeles. Is he a "California
judge"?
I shall make no attempt to answer these questions, for the
answers are irrelevant. Arguments about "California judges" and
"regionalized.. . review" rest on fundamental misconceptions
about the role of the federal courts of appeals in our legal system.
As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is part
of a national court system. As an appellate court, its responsibility is to articulate and expound rules of law. For the most part,
its decisions interpret the law of the United States-the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress.
Surely the interpretation of federal law should be, to the
greatest extent possible, uniform throughout the country. In the
early years of the 19th century, Justice Story lamented "[t]he
public mischiefs" that would result if "the laws, the treaties, and
the constitution of the United States ...

[did not] have precisely

the same construction, obligation or efficiency in any two
states."97 These concerns have no less force today.9" It would be
perverse to create a new circuit to promote interpretations of fedBurns).
94. New Circuit Court Reasonable, The Idaho Statesman, Aug. 2, 1995, at 8A.
1995 Gorton Statement, supra note 5, at S7504.
95.
96. The theme of regionalism has been de-emphasized in the latter phases of
the debate over dividing the Ninth Circuit, but it has not entirely disappeared. Thus
it is worthwhile to address the point.
97. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
98. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and
Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITt. L. REv. 693, 698-99 (1995).
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eral law that would differ from those in force elsewhere in the
country.
Perhaps this is not what is meant by the reference to "a
California perspective." Perhaps the argument is only that judges should understand the regional milieu out of which cases
arise." If so, the answer is simple. To the extent that the "regional milieu" is relevant to the legal issues, we can expect that
it will be developed in the record. Development of a record-the
facts upon which decision is to be based-is the responsibility of
the lawyers and the trial court. Trial judges, of course, are appointed from the bar of the state in which the court sits. They
will be fully familiar with the regional milieu. And if the materials of record do not suffice to clarify the regional background, we
can expect the advocates on both sides to do so, just as they
would with issues of science, technology, or business practices
that may not be familiar to appellate judges.
In short, to the extent that cases turn on an understanding
of local conditions, the regional perspective will be reflected in
the work of the district judge; to the extent that cases turn on
the law, the goal is to minimize the variations from one jurisdiction to another. "Regionalized... review" by the court of appeals
is thus a poor argument for creating a new circuit.
Fortunately, the theme of regionalism appears to have been
largely cast onto the sidelines in the more recent discussions of
circuit division."° The Senate report in support of the Judiciary
Committee substitute explicitly disclaims the idea of "altering
circuit boundaries in order... to benefit any regional interest." O Neither of the sponsors of the House bill made any reference to regionalized review.01 2 Thus, the debate over circuit
division can concentrate, as it always should have done, on the
question: will creation of a new circuit improve the administra-

99. This theme was sounded by two of the sponsors of S. 956 in an article supporting an earlier proposal to divide the Ninth Circuit. See Mark 0. Hatfield &
Slade Gorton, Time for a New Federal Circuit in the West: Why the Ninth Circuit
Should Be Divided, DAILY J. REP., Sept. 29, 1989.
100. It has not disappeared entirely, however. On January 9, 1996, a resolution

was introduced in the Alaska Legislature in support of the original version of S.956.
The resolution argues that creation of a Twelfth Circuit "would benefit [the five
northwestern states] by providing speedier and more consistent rulings by jurists who
have a greater familiarity with the social, geographical, political, and economic life of
the region." Alaska H.J.R. Res., 19th Legis., 2d Sess. (1996).
101. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
102. See 142 CoNG. REc. E166-01 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1996) (statement of Rep.

Bunn).
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tion of justice in the West?
VI. THE LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE

The thrust of the argument thus far has been that the proponents of dividing the Ninth Circuit have not met their burden
of proof. That being so, there is no need to consider the possible
negative consequences of enacting the legislation. Nevertheless,
one of those consequences does warrant discussion: the danger
that splitting the Ninth Circuit today will interfere with
Congress's ability to pursue more comprehensive appellate reform in the future.
To recognize this danger is not to say that Congress should
do nothing. Obscured by the debate over circuit realignment in
the West are legitimate concerns about caseload growth and its
effects on the speed, quality, and uniformity of dispositions in
the federal appellate courts throughout the Nation. These concerns should be addressed on a national basis, and the way to do
it is by establishing a study commission to make recommendations that will serve the country over the long term.
A. The Dangersof PiecemealRealignment
At the hearings on S. 956 and again in the Judiciary Committee markup sessions, Senators debated the fine points of the
Ninth Circuit's caseload management statistics and what they
tell us about the court's effectiveness. It was easy to lose sight of
a fundamental fact: the Ninth Circuit's problems are problems
that are shared, in varying degrees and in differing manifestations, by all of the circuits. Caseloads have grown throughout the
country. Each circuit has responded in its own way to the pressures of burgeoning dockets. Some of the techniques are more
visible than others, but all involve departures from the traditional model of the appellate process."
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee concluded that
the federal appellate courts were already in a "crisis of volume."'"' It anticipated that "within as few as five years the
nation could have to decide whether or not to abandon the present circuit structure in favor of an alternative structure that
might better organize the more numerous appellate judges need-

103. For a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of caseload growth and the
devices used to cope with it, see MCKENNA, supra note 63.
104.

STUDY COMMITE REPORT, supra note 20, at 109.
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ed to grapple with a swollen caseload." °5 The Committee's report presented several "structural alternatives," but it did not
endorse any
of them; instead, it called for "further inquiry and
discussion. " '"
Dividing the Ninth Circuit today would significantly interfere with Congress's ability to pursue the reconsideration that
the Study Committee urged. This is so for three reasons.
First, if a Twelfth Circuit is established-whatever its configuration-the effect will be to create new structural arrangements and institutionalize new modes of doing business. These
will soon take on a life of their own, reinforcing the status quo
and making comprehensive reform more difficult.
Senator Harry Reid of Nevada made this point vividly in the
course of the Senate debate on S. 956. To split the Ninth Circuit
now, he said,
is the wrong way to do it. [If we do, we] have already, in effect,
let the cow out of the barn, because it makes it almost impossible to go back and pull out some of the resources, the assets of
the twelfth and ninth circuits, to help realign part of the other
circuits if, in fact, that [proves] necessary.0 7
Second, dividing the Ninth Circuit would set Congress on a
course that prefers circuit splitting to other, perhaps more fruitful, measures for meeting the "crisis" of appellate overload. Indeed, even today, the division of the Fifth Circuit is being cited
as a precedent for dividing the Ninth, notwithstanding the many
and significant differences between the two situations.'
Finally, to divide the Ninth Circuit now would be to lose the
full benefit of a vital experiment in judicial administration. As
noted above, the Federal Courts Study Committee presented
several models of appellate reorganization, but it did not endorse
any of them. That is quite understandable. None of the models is
very attractive; all have serious drawbacks.
Over the last decade, the Ninth Circuit has undertaken a
remarkable range of innovations in an effort to determine whether a large circuit can be made to work effectively. Nothing could
be more useful to Congress as it considers systemic reform than
to have the concrete empirical information that the Ninth
Circuit's experimentation will provide.

105.

Id.

106.
107.
108.

Id. at 116-24.
142 CONG. REc. S2219-03, S2227 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996).
See supra note 30.
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Of course, it would be wrong to conduct an experiment if the
"subjects"--here, the judges, lawyers, and citizens of the Ninth
Circuit-were being hurt by it. But the evidence is overwhelming
that they are not. For example, bar associations in five Ninth
Circuit states have spoken out on the division proposed by the
original version of S. 956. All have expressed opposition to the
If there are
split."° So has the Federal Bar Association.'
contrary perceptions, they have not thus far surfaced.
B. The ProposedNew Study Commission
More than five years have passed since the Federal Courts
Study Committee issued the strong warning quoted in the preceding section."' Rather than divide one circuit ad hoc, Congress should proceed systematically by creating a new, focused
commission to examine the problems of the entire appellate
system and make recommendations that will serve the country
for the long run.
As already noted, a proposal along these lines has been
adopted by the Senate. The Senate bill-derived from an amendment offered initially by Senator Dianne Feinstein of Californialuwould create an eleven-member Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. In essence,
the commission would take up where the Federal Courts Study
Committee left off.
The proposed commission would be the first of its kind since
the Hruska Commission, which completed its work in 1975, more
than 20 years ago. Needless to say, dramatic changes have taken
place in the work of the federal courts in those two decades,
including explosive growth. But there have been no structural alterations except for the division of the old Fifth Circuit and the
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Nor has there been a study commission that could bring to
bear a variety of perspectives on the work of the federal appellate courts. To be sure, recommendations on federal appellate
structure were made by the Committee on Long-Range Planning

109. See 142 CONG. REC. S2221-23 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Reid) (resolutions by bar associations in Arizona, Nevada, Montana, California, and
Hawaii).

110.

Id. at S2223.

111. See supra text accompanying note 105.
112. Senator Feinstein's proposed amendment was drafted initially by the present
writer.
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of the Judicial Conference of the United States in its 1995 report."' But those recommendations represented the views of
only one of the constituent groups, the judges. Of course, the
views of the judges-especially those articulated after careful
study, as was the case here-should be given heavy weight in
any process of structural reform. But those views should be integrated with those of other knowledgeable participants, including
lawyers and legislators.
The name of the proposed commission is taken from section
302 of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. That statute requested that the Federal Judicial Center study "the full range of
structural alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals."114
The Center completed the study and sent it to Congress in
1993."' The study is a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis
of the problems of the courts of appeals, and it can well serve as
a starting-point for future inquiries. However, the Center was
not asked to make recommendations, and it did not do so. Thus
it would be a logical follow-up to have a full-scale commission,
composed of judges, legislators, and other knowledgeable citizens, to examine the policy issues and make recommendations to
Congress and the President. That is the object of the Senate bill.
The proposed statute first directs the commission to study
"the present division of the United States into the several judicial circuits."1 6 Next, the statute calls for a study of "the structure and alignment of the Federal courts of appeals with particular reference to the ninth circuit." "7 Finally, the statute requires a report that makes recommendations "for such changes
in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the
expeditious and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with fundamental concepts of
fairness and due process."1 18
The statute does not further specify the areas or issues that
the commission would be expected to consider. However, drawing
upon the legislative history (including the hearing on S. 956, the
markup sessions of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Committee Report on the bill, and the floor debate in the Senate on
March 18, 1996), I have identified some of the more specific

113. PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 23, at 39-52.
114. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
115. McKENNA, supra note 63.
116. S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § (1)(b)(1) (1995).
117. Id. § (1)(b)(2).
118. Id. § (1)(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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issues that the Commission might address."9 These fall into
two broad groups. The first encompasses circuit realignment; the
second embraces other possible approaches to structural reform.
1. Circuit Realignment: Options and Consequences
Should Congress take action in the immediate future to
divide the Ninth Circuit? If so, what is the preferable realignment? If the time has not yet come to divide the circuit, can we
identify criteria or benchmarks that will identify the point at
which division becomes desirable?
More generally, is there a point at which a court of appeals
is too large to operate effectively? If so, how can that point be
identified? Does circuit size affect the speed at which cases are
handled? Does it affect the ability of the court of appeals to provide a knowable, coherent body of circuit law?
Do large or small circuits better serve the functions performed by the federal courts of appeals, or can both serve them
effectively? If small, medium, and large courts can adequately
serve the citizens of their circuits, are there overriding national
reasons to make the circuits approximately the same size?
In considering possible realignment of the circuits, what
weight should be given to tradition and the likelihood of disruption if states were shifted from one circuit to another? If additional circuits were created, would it be necessary to create a
new level of courts to resolve a larger number of intercircuit
conflicts? 2 °
2. Alternative Approaches to StructuralReform
What are the alternatives to circuit realignment as a means
of assuring the effective performance of the appellate function,
now and in the future? What are the tradeoffs of the various
models of structural reform, such as those sketched in the report
of the Federal Courts Study Committee? If structural reform is
119. The bill approved by the Senate would require the commission to make its
recommendations no later than February 28, 1997. This deadline is hopelessly unrealistic. In outlining the issues and areas that the commission might consider, I am
assuming that Congress, if it creates the commission, will give it adequate time (and
funding) with which to carry out the work.
120. At the hearing on the original version of S. 956 several Senators expressed
concern that creating a new circuit would add to the number of conflicts between
circuits that the Supreme Court would be required to resolve. See Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate
(1995).
1st Sess.1996
104th Cong.,
on the Judiciary,
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necessary, is it preferable to build new structures within existing
circuits or to establish new tiers or channels of review outside
the existing system?
How many judges are needed to handle the appellate caseload appropriately? Should the number of judgeships in the
courts of appeals be substantially increased, as some have proposed? Or (as has been suggested in recent hearings) do some
circuits have more judges than they really need? 2 ' Are there
additional nonstructural changes that circuit judges could make
to allow their courts to handle more cases while still giving each
appeal the attention it deserves? What is the relationship between opinion writing and publication practices and the structure of the federal appellate system?
If appellate caseloads continue to grow, could they be accommodated simply through adding judges to existing circuits? If so,
would new structural arrangements be required? What would
the consequences be for coherence and consistency in federal
decisional law?
VII. CONCLUSION
Dividing the Ninth Circuit is an old idea whose time has not
yet come-if indeed it ever will. The arguments made by the
proponents of the original version of S. 956 and the Senate Judiciary Committee substitute do not withstand analysis. The Senate was therefore wise not to adopt the bill in that form. For the
same reasons, the House should concur in the version of S. 956
approved by the Senate and create the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. The new commission can look carefully at the structure of the federal appellate
courts and make recommendations that can provide a sound
foundation for Congressional action in the future.

121.

See Richard J. Carelli, Need for D.C. Judges Questioned, THE DAILY RE-

CoRD, Oct. 30, 1995.
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